Club 30's "Kill the Boredom Demon" Jive Pad 155th Edition
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I'm telling u, they neglect maintanence... How can they afford decent maintanence and part change when they have such an unholy payout dividend???
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But to be fair, our MRT system has also proven itself to be safe.......and somewhat reliable (arguable and dependant on whether you are victim).
I won't be taking that for granted since I already had a horrible time in a certain 3rd world country.
Still, we can improve!
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SMRT’s then-CEO Ms Saw Phaik Hwa (“Ms Saw”) (W87), who was
also notified of the RIMP, stayed behind to host the company event as the
magnitude of the disruptions was not known yet. She was comfortable
leaving the situation in the hands of SMRT’s senior train management. She
received regular updates from the Head of Crisis Communications Goh Chee
Kong who kept her informed of the situation through regular SMS messages.
She also received updates from Executive Vice President (Trains) Khoo Hean
Siang (“EVP Khoo”) (W115) and SVP Tan (W84). The Board members were
kept updated via SMS messages sent by the OCC.
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What did we do to deserve shoddy materials for our rail network? Were they cutting corners and shady dealings, the sort of things my dad spoke of --- when he talked about Malaysian made cars?
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Originally posted by Kuali Baba:
What did we do to deserve shoddy materials for our rail network? Were they cutting corners and shady dealings, the sort of things my dad spoke of --- when he talked about Malaysian made cars?
i don't think it is shoody material but poor maintenance -
The COI was also very damning in how SMRT was wholly paralysed in every aspect except safety
SM Fan testified that there were about 1,000 plus passengers at the
platform at Braddell station after the detrainment. There were a number of
passengers who were unhappy as they had to leave the platform. Some
passengers at the platform and concourse refused to leave the station.
Although he had been asked to tell the passengers to proceed to the shuttle
bus service pick up points, the OCC could not tell him when the shuttle
service would arrive. This caused much unhappiness as people wanted to
know the time and frequency of the shuttle service. It resulted in much verbal
abuse directed at SM Fan and his staff at the PSC
The picture gathered was that nobody knew what in the world was going on.
And even the train drivers were left with no choice but to use their own mobile phone to try to figure out what the shit was happening to their trains!
Apparently these poor fellas not only lacked proper training in such situations, but even proper tools and channels.
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Honestly, these type of technical issues, u tell the CEO also no use one...The CEO isn't the technical officer who could resolve this issue...
Even the CEO going there also will solve nthing...
The whole technical/engineering team was totally caught offguard and dunno how to respond...
One thing I'm curious to know was, how was the communication to the CEO? Was it "vetted" and sugarcoatted to look as if nthing big is going on and everything is under control...
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It seems the technical guys were doing as best as they could, and knew perfectly what to do.
The problem was on the people and sitaution-handling....
The evidence before the COI also revealed that some of the CSTs did
not turn up when activated. For example, CST Leader Lay Chin Yong (W63),
who was assigned to Ang Mo Kio station, testified that out of the 14 members
under him, only eight turned up. Similarly, CST Leader Philip Tay Kim Hoo
(W57) who was assigned to Dhoby Ghaut station, testified that six of his 14
team members could not turn up as they were on leave. CST Leader Eng Wee
Jin (W55), who was assigned to City Hall station, testified that of the 14 who
were supposed to report for duty, three did not turn up.
CST refers to Customer Service Team...
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Originally posted by SBS2601D:
The COI was also very damning in how SMRT was wholly paralysed in every aspect except safety
SM Fan testified that there were about 1,000 plus passengers at the
platform at Braddell station after the detrainment. There were a number of
passengers who were unhappy as they had to leave the platform. Some
passengers at the platform and concourse refused to leave the station.
Although he had been asked to tell the passengers to proceed to the shuttle
bus service pick up points, the OCC could not tell him when the shuttle
service would arrive. This caused much unhappiness as people wanted to
know the time and frequency of the shuttle service. It resulted in much verbal
abuse directed at SM Fan and his staff at the PSC
The picture gathered was that nobody knew what in the world was going on.
And even the train drivers were left with no choice but to use their own mobile phone to try to figure out what the shit was happening to their trains!
Apparently these poor fellas not only lacked proper training in such situations, but even proper tools and channels.
I can only say that they do not have proper crisis management experience/training...There are only a few MRT station which has refresher training in crisis management, due to SCDF NorthStar training exercise...
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And then comes the bus-bridging phail.....
DDSO Teo (W81) also requested MBOCC Ho to contact SBS Transit
(SBST) to request that they provide assistance. However, SBST could not
provide SMRT with any buses. Therefore, DDSO Teo (W81) requested
MBOCC Ho to activate the sub-contractor buses. These private buses were
activated to carry out the bus bridging service between Ang Mo Kio station
and Bishan station
It was peak hour and SBST would have found it very hard to help SMRT.
In any case remember what happened with the SMRT bus-strike? SBST to the rescue again....
It seems that SMRT very much lacked all the redundancies with all the streamlining rhetoric we had through 90s and 2000s.
It "saved" us cost....but gave us one heck of a nightmare when the trains brokedown.
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According to Staff Sergeant Nizar of the SCDF (W106), a “995” call was
received at about 7.16 pm from a member of the public about a passenger
who had fainted inside a train between Somerset and Orchard stations. He
tried to verify with the OCC as to the exact location of the train and whether
the Fire Brigade was required. He used the “red phone” which provided a
direct connection to the OCC. He called about three to four times but there
was no response. As a precautionary measure, he despatched a Fire Brigade
to Orchard station. He continued calling and after 15 minutes, someone from the OCC answered the call. He asked the person if SMRT needed assistance
with regard to the information that a person had fainted in a train. The OCC
personnel replied that no assistance from the SCDF was required.
And here comes the clear contradiction caused by the comms phail....
The testimony of CC Moksin (W8) at the Inquiry revealed that there
was a lot of focus on the recovery of service but very little attention was given
to the well-being of passengers inside the stalled trains. CC Moksin did not
know that SCDF officers had been despatched to T134 until he saw them on
the CCTV monitor:
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as I said communication is total fail...
talking abt fail... I did an epic fail by routing my desk phone to my mobile phone and proceed to head out to get some food nearby... ... ... but I left my mobile phone on my desk -_________-
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And where's fudge, you were asking about the permanence of the use of cable-tie? Maybe this will give you some clue:
After the incident of the sagged third rail in 2006 at Bishan Depot and the high-speed
ramp sag incident in 2010, cable ties were introduced at certain vulnerable
areas such as FSTs and high-speed ramps. However, the COI notes that prior
to the December 2011 incidents, about a third of the claws (i.e. close to 10,000
out of the 30,000 claws) in the NSEWL were still not secured with spring clips,
steel caps or cable ties.
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Worse:
it came to be acceptable that the MFV software and the UMS were unreliable. In particular, the MFV software was allowed to deteriorate to the extent that following revenue service on 15 December 2011, SMRT faced a Hobson’s choice of having to rely either on manual inspection or the MFV with a reliability of 80%.
The COI struck me as sounding extremely unhappy with SMRT's manteinance regime which appeared to look good on paper (remember Straits Times reporting SMRT saying that they exceed manufacturer's recommendations), but turned out to be blighted by serious problems.
Such as separating reliability from safety issue which were clearly interlinked!
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And SMRT's obsession with image at expense of the less visible:
Although the interiors of trains have been refurbished, there does not appear
to be any upgrade in terms of engineering components. Prior to the incidents,
there were no plans to look into the replacement of the third rail and TRSAs.
The MFV for the NSEWL has been in operation since the 1990s if not
earlier. There has been no upgrade to its software, which is still based on
PASCAL. It has deteriorated over the years, with occasional failures, such as
that which occurred on the early morning of 17 December 2011. At the time of the incidents in December 2011, there was only one MFV for use on the entire NSEWL.
The COI had questioned SMRT personnel on why the MFV, being a critical piece of equipment, was not subjected to a mid-life upgrade of its software, which may have prevented the incident on 17 December 11, but did not receive any satisfactory answer.
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SMRT was still using 1980s era software to do their track worthiness analysis.. The worst is the divd payout... they need the cash for replacement needs i.e. cyclic business cycle.. But GLCs all along give > 80% divd payout...
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acid mei mei.. comms set also went down.. concidental or suay...
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oops.
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Originally posted by SBS2601D:
Another pair of panties successfully soiled!
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great!
needed a light heartening joke to start the day
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Chua sai~
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darn! wasted better part of afternoon doing up slides to be told (too late) that they didnt need them after all
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Box the fella.
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Go for it Cassie~~~
